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American Wartime Plans for a New Hungary and the Paris Peace Conference, 1941–1947

On December 28, 1941, three weeks after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the establishment of a special organization within the Department of State. It was called the Advisory Committee on Post-war Foreign Policy and its task was to work out the policies that would guide the United States during postwar peace negotiations. The chairman of the Committee was Secretary of State Cordell Hull; its deputy-chairman was Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, and the actual day-to-day operations of the Committee were the responsibility of Leo Pasvolsky (1893–1953), an economist of Russian descent and one of Hull's advisers. Other key figures on the Advisory Committee included: Isaiah Bowman (1878–1950), a professor of geography and, from 1915 to 1935, president of the National Geographic Society, after 1935 professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University; Hamilton Fish Armstrong (1893–1973), editor of *Foreign Affairs*; Anne O'Hare McCormick (1882–1954), foreign policy analyst of *The New York Times;* Herbert Feis (1893–1972), economic consultant to the Department of State at the time and later one of the best-known historians of the war and Cold War years; Philip E. Mosely (1905–1972), a young Harvard graduate and a specialist in East European history who made a name for himself in the postwar decades as an expert on East Europe and the Balkans; and John C. Campbell (1911–), one of the youngest members of the Committee, also an East European specialist who made a career similar to that of Mosely.[1]

The Committee functioned under different names until the end of the war, holding hundreds of meetings and producing thousands of reports. The materials it accumulated amounted to nearly 300 boxes and included approximately 800 typewritten pages dealing exclusively with the future of Hungary. In this paper, I shall mainly discuss the material pertaining to American ideas and proposals concerning post-war Hungary.

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[1] Harley Notter: *Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation 1939–1945.*Washington, 1949, pp. 3–82, 119–159, 520–525; *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning. State Department Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939–1945.* Washington D. C. 1987, pp. ix–xii. The biographical data are based on various encyclopedias.

This paper is divided into four parts. First, I shall deal with the larger context of the problem: with Eastern and Central Europe, and the various schemes concerning regional cooperation. The second section deals with ethnic tensions and their possible remedies, including the revision of frontiers. The subject of the third part will be the question of democratization in Hungary. Finally, I intend to conclude this brief survey by discussing the complete failure of the proposed American policy toward Hungary.

I.

Plans for closer economic and political cooperation in the Danube region represented one of the major concerns of the Committee members. They considered it crucial, especially as regards security and economic viability. In terms of security, Committee members wanted the region to act as a bulwark against possible German or Russian penetration, and even against joint Russian-German aggression as happened in 1939.

The other main consideration, economic rationality, aimed at diminishing social tensions and creating the foundation for functioning democracies. It was believed that, without a minimum living standard, the region would continue to be a source of potential conflict. It was also believed that a higher living standard could not be achieved within fragmented and isolated economies; it could only be achieved in the framework of a larger economic unit that shared a common market, common currency, and customs union.

All agreed up to this point. There was, however, no consensus on the borders or on the specific form of regional cooperation. It was originally proposed that the economic unit be as large as possible, that it should encompass all countries from the Baltic to the Aegean. It was quickly realized, however, that this large region was composed of several sub-regions and that these sub-regions were heterogeneous as regards culture, religion, and history. So after long discussion, most members of the Advisory Committee were inclined to accept a plan calling for two East European federations: a Balkan union and a northern union. A possible third sub-unit, a Danubia federation, was briefly considered though the reconstitution of the Habsburg Empire proposed by Otto von Habsburg was never seriously advocated.[2]

Until the summer of 1943 the Advisory Committee was unable to reach a clear consensus on these matters. They did agree on certain things: that the form of regional cooperation should not be a federation but a union of independent and sovereign states, "cooperating for limited objectives through common non-

[2] National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter: NA), RG 59. Notter File, Box 55. P Minutes 10, May 9, 1942. In Ignác Romsics (ed.): *Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Documents from the U.S. Department of State, 1942–1944.* New York 1992, pp. 57–71. See: Sumner Welles: *The Time for Decision.* New York 1944, pp. 255–256.

legislative institutions, loosely rather than tightly organized."[3]

II.

It was also believed that economic and political cooperation in the region – and here I come to the second part of this paper – could ease ethnic tensions. And yet the Committee was also convinced that such cooperation on its own – i.e. the abolition or 'spiritualization' of the borders – would not be enough. To solve or at least reduce the problem, important additional methods and devices would be needed. The following three proposals were put forward:

- the adjustment of political frontiers along ethnic dividing lines wherever possible;
- exchange of populations living near border areas;
- protection of minorities, international guarantees, and sanctioning of minority rights including the right to cultural and territorial autonomy in the case of large but remote enclaves.

I will now turn to the specific proposals that emerged from this model.

As far as borders were concerned, the Committee identified twenty-four disputed areas in Eastern Europe. Practically all of Hungary's borders were identified as requiring redefinition, with the exception of the Burgenland and the former Austro-Hungarian frontier, which were accepted as fair. The proposed solution for the Slovak-Hungarian frontier was the modification of the Trianon border more or less along ethno-linguistic line. As indicated on Map 2, four possible solutions were proposed based on the Czechoslovak census of 1930. Economic factors and transportation systems were also taken into consideration, though these sometimes conflicted with ethnic patterns. After protracted discussion, a compromise was finally reached. Instead of an emphatically pro-Hungarian solution (Figure 4) or a pro-Slovak variant (Figure 2), an intermediate version was selected as the preferred solution (Figure 3): namely, a territory of almost 3,000 square miles, with a population close to half a million, would be returned to Hungary. The ratio of ethnic Hungarians in this territory amounted to 64% (again according to the Czechoslovak census). The actual proportion of Hungarians was probably above 70%. Had this plan been adopted, more than 200,000 Hungarians would have remained on the Slovak side of the new border. In order to decrease the size of this minority population, the Advisory Committee proposed a voluntary exchange of population to take place under international control.[4]

Similar techniques were proposed in the case of Ruthenia. As indicated on Map 5, the border area in Ruthenia was inhabited mainly by a Hungarian-speaking population. However, a logistical problem lay in the fact that the only

[3] *Loc. cit.*, Box 56. P Document 24, June 19, 1942. In Romsics, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–76.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 91–116 and 169–203.

railway line connecting Slovakia with Ruthenia ran through this region to the main railway junction at Chop. Finally, the Committee based its decision on ethnic demography rather than on the transport lines. In accordance with this decision, the Committee recommended the solution shown as Figure 3 on the map. The assumption was that it would be easier to solve the transportation problem by building a new railway line than to resettle an ethnic Hungarian population of approximately 80,000. This solution would have assigned to Hungary an area of about 535 square miles with a total population of about 90,000. According to the Hungarian census of 1910, approximately 78% of the population in question were Hungarian-speaking; according to the Czechoslovak data compiled in 1930, the number was only 58%. Based on this conflicting data, demographic experts of the Committee estimated the proportion as being 75%. For the remaining Hungarian population – estimates varied from 60,000 to 100,000 depending on the census – an exchange or unilateral removal was recommended.[5]

Because of its specific ethnic mixture, Transylvania proved to be a much more difficult problem. Various solutions displayed on Map 4 were discussed on three consecutive occasions in February 1943. The restoration of the Trianon borders of 1920 was considered undesirable; even Romanian census figures from 1930 indicated that Trianon placed a million and a half ethnic Hungarians under Romanian rule. "It would," it was concluded, "perpetuate a difficult minority situation." However, restoration of the pre-Trianon status quo (i. e., returning all of Transylvania to Hungary) was viewed as an even less desirable solution, because it would create a minority of three million Romanians within Hungary. The third possibility presented for consideration was to retain the borders established with the 1940 partition. Nevertheless this solution was impractical in terms of both economic and infrastructural considerations, and the partition would restore to Hungary not only the purely ethnic Hungarian easternmost region, Székelyföld, and the western regions that were predominantly Hungarian-speaking, but also one million Romanians living in ethnically mixed regions. Instead of accepting any of the above-mentioned solutions, the Committee decided to give preference to a new alternative: that most of Transylvania would belong to Romania but the Székely region would be given wide-ranging autonomy and the Romanian-Hungarian border would be revised in favor of Hungary. Map 4 illustrates the consequences of this: namely, that Hungary would be awarded a territory of 5,600 square miles with a population of more than one million of which only 35% was Hungarian (again according to the 1930 Romanian census). It was suggested that this solution could be combined with a population exchange involving the Romanians living in the border area and the approximately 600,000 Hungarians remaining in Transylvania outside of Székelys. The next most favoured solution was the establishment of an inde-

[5] NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 65. T Documents 387–388. October 16 and 28, 1943.

pendent state of Transylvania that would be a member of the proposed Mid-European union, a condominium of Romania and Hungary.[6]

As far as the Yugoslav-Hungarian border was concerned the Committee's specialist on the matter, a young historian, distinguished five separate areas open to dispute (see Map 3, Figure 1).There were 28 predominantly Hungarian communities in the so-called 'Wend' (Slovenian) area along the southwestern frontier established at Trianon. The specialist recommended that the postwar adjustment recognize these as belonging to Hungary. The greater part of so-called Prekmurje, however, which was inhabited by Slovenians and the predominantly Croatian Medjumurje, both of which became Hungarian territories in the spring of 1941, were considered to be parts of Yugoslavia's ethnic territory. Along the southern border – in Baranya, Bácska, and the Bánát – he recommended a compromise solution similar to the American proposal of 1919, a solution which followed linguistic criteria to the greatest extent possible. As shown by the Figures 3 and 4 (Map 3), this compromise solution, returning the recommended northern districts to Hungary, would have left about as many Hungarians under Yugoslav rule (150,000) as Yugoslavs under Hungarian rule (174,000). This northern area, an area of 2,476 square miles, had a population of almost half a million, the ethnic distribution of which, according to the 1921 Yugoslav census, was as follows: 47% ethnic Hungarians, Southern Slavs 36%, German speakers 16%.

This proposal was rejected on the grounds that Hungary, an enemy state, should not be rewarded at the expense of Yugoslavia, which was considered an ally. Instead the Committee voted at the beginning of 1943 for the *status quo ante bellum*. However, within a few months this rigid position was reconsidered and changed. By the summer of 1943, the original proposal became the recommended solution with some minor modifications. The reason for this change of course remains unknown.[7]

A number of scattered minority groups and some quite large minority enclaves would have remained in most countries under consideration even if the border adjustments along ethnic lines had been consistently applied and populations had been exchanged on a large scale. Therefore, a system of minority rights and protection was also considered a necessity. Given the failure of the minority protection system of the League of Nations, the Committee wanted to work out a more effective solution. The most important proposal was the effective sanction of the protection system and the establishment of an international armed force to intervene in cases where minority rights were violated.

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6 Romsics, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–168 and 211–216; *Cf.* NA RG 226. Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch (hereafter: OSS, FNB), INT–15HU–80, 352–353 and 677.

7 Romsics, *op. cit.*, pp. 126–147, 204–210, and 228–231.

III.

After dealing with plans for an East European confederation, ethnic tensions and border issues, we will now turn to the internal problems of Hungary, that is to the issue of democratization. In its minutes and reports, the Committee repeatedly described the Horthy regime as "semi-authoritarian in character." The goal of the Committee, therefore, was to replace it with "a truly democratic government." According to analyses, interwar Hungary suffered from two great weaknesses: lack of real land reform and lack of real political democracy.[8]

The Committee dedicated most of its attention to land reform. A radical redistribution of holdings was defined as "a prerequisite for the establishment of a more democratic Hungary." However, the preferred alternative was "a rationally-planned reform" very similar to that advocated by the Károlyi Revolution of 1918–1919, rather than an agrarian revolution determined by essentially political motives. The planned land reform would take place "under the guidance of competent agronomists and with proper physical and financial implementation." It was projected that the entire process would take approximately ten years. The proposed size of the newly created farms would range from eight to fifty acres.[9]

The other issue studied in depth was the establishment of a post-war political system and the desirable composition of the future government. The Committee expressed strong reservations about either an authoritarian or soviet system. They thought it highly unlikely that the Hungarian people would opt for either one of them. Therefore, the "preferred solution" was "a democratic government in either a monarchical or republican form." In terms of the leadership of such a democratic government, they envisioned a popular front-type coalition involving Social Democrats, Smallholders, Liberal Democrats close to Mihály Károlyi and Oszkár Jászi, as well as certain intellectual groups within Hungary, especially some of the so-called populist writers.[10]

No decision was made regarding the future head of state. Committee members agreed, however, that the old ruling elite, including Horthy and István Bethlen should have no leading role in postwar Hungary. It was emphasized that the "old guard's" retention of power "would mean the continuation of an authoritarian regime" and "in all probability Hungary would again be a factor of instability in the Balkan-Danube region." The other factor which obviously influenced decision-making was the openly hostile attitude of the Russians to the survival of the Horthy regime in any form. The Advisory Committee learned

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8 NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 153. H Document 104, January 22, 1944.

9 *Loc. cit.*, Box 65. T Documents 430 and 431. Hungarian Land Reform Since 1918, and Hungarian Agriculture; Box 66. T Document 465, March 11, 1944. A Suggested Basis for Land Reform in Hungary and Box 153. H Document 87-a, May 2, 1944. Hungary, Land Reform.

10 *Loc. cit.*, Box 71. TS–58. Hungary. IV. Permanent Government, February 9, 1944, and Box 153. H Document 104. January 27, 1944. *Cf.*, RG 226. OSS. Box 177. No. 27158.

that "the Russians have expressed their objection to the retention of the regency and of the regime of the landlords."[11]

The Committee did not rule out the possibility that a new democratic Hungary would be a monarchy. Nevertheless, the possible enthronement of Otto von Habsburg was rejected. It was presumed, probably incorrectly, that Otto von Habsburg would object to radical land reform. Moreover, his ties to the aristocracy were considered too strong. The final document about Hungary stated: "The U.S. should disapprove the restoration of the Habsburgs to the throne of Hungary."[12]

IV.

If even half of these proposals were implemented in the postwar period, Hungary would probably have been one of the most satisfied countries in the world. However, as we know, not a single one of these proposals was carried out. Let us now examine the failure of the program.

t was clear that the plan of an East European confederation was illusory once the region was recognized as falling under the Soviet sphere of influence. Soviet diplomacy, as expressed in Molotov's famous letter of June 7, 1943, left no doubt about that.

...as regards the question of the creation of a federation in Europe of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece including Hungary and Austria, the Soviet Government is unwilling to commit to the creation of such a federation, and also considers the inclusion of Hungary and Austria within it as unsuitable.[13]

By the end of 1943, American diplomats had more or less agreed to let Stalin have his way in Eastern Europe. In Teheran, Roosevelt agreed to have Poland 'pushed' west, and agreed to the 1941 borders in the north and south as well. Sumner Welles, hypocritically, deferred to "the peoples of the Baltic States desire to form an integral part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."[14] That official Washington had increasing reservations with regard to the original proposal of the Advisory Committee was indicated also by the change in terminology. Instead of the terms "Mid-European union," "confederation" or "federation," 1944 documents for the most part refer to "regional groupings." A memo in connection with "a Democratic Danubian or East European Federation," dated January 22, 1944, notes: "At present, such regional units are viewed with disfavour in official quarters."[15]

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11 NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 154. H Document 135, February 26, 1944. Hungary. Transition to Permanent Government.

12 Romsics, *op. cit.,* pp. 37–39.

13 NA RG 59. M 1244/17. Records of the Office of European Affairs, 1934–1947.

14 Sumner Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–255, and 332; *Cf.* Stephen Borsody: *The Tragedy of Central Europe: Nazi and Soviet Conquest and Aftermath.* New Haven 1980, pp. 123–126.

15 NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 153. H Document 104, January 22, 1944.

The disintegration of the idealistic plans formulated between 1942 and 1944 behind the padded doors of the State Department continued during the last year of the war, and throughout the course of 1946–1947. That this occurred was due not to some conceptual void in American diplomacy, as some have suggested, nor to Roosevelt's illness, but to the Soviets' dominance in the region and to the fact that the Americans had no material interest in challenging this dominance.

The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 was the last time American foreign policy objectives included an ethnically-based solution to the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian border disputes.[16] By the time the Allied foreign ministers met in London in September 1945, the issue had received a new formulation. There, and from then on, the Allies were in agreement that "the frontier with Hungary should be, in general, the frontier existing in 1938," and that the only areas still in dispute were Transylvania and the Romanian-Hungarian border.[17]

Several factors contributed to the Americans' abandonment of the principle of ethnic fairness, which they had considered so important at the time of the peace preparations. The most significant was that, contrary to Washington's expectations, the governments in Belgrade and Prague were adamantly opposed to any kind of frontier adjustment. The same politicians who, in 1942, 1943, and even early in 1944, considered the redrawing of the Hungarian-Slovak border a distinct possibility, believed, after the summer of 1944, that the only way to resolve the border dispute between the countries was to remove the Hungarian population from Czechoslovakia.[18] Similar feelings could be observed in Yugoslavia as well. The government in Belgrade asked for Allied permission to 'exchange' 40,000 ethnic Hungarians, and this number was in addition to those who had already fled in order to escape retaliation at the hands of the Yugoslav Partisans. Further, it registered an official claim to 50 square miles of the border region between Austria and Hungary north of the Drava River, emphasizing in its propaganda the legitimacy of annexing other adjacent Hungarian territories, mainly in the province of Baranya.[19] It was due primarily to the firmness of the

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16 Potsdam Conference Documents 1945. Reel 1. The Berlin Conference. Territorial Studies. July 6, 1945. University Publications of America (Microfilm).

17 United States Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter, *FRUS*), *Diplomatic Papers 1945.* 2, (Washington: USGPO, 1967), vol. 2, 279; *Cf.*, Bennett Korvig: Peacemaking after World War II: The End of the Myth of National Self-Determination. In: *The Hungarians: A Divided Nation* (ed. Stephen Borsody). New Haven 1988, pp. 69–88.

18 NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 116. CAC–328. December 15, 1944; *FRUS 1946*, vol. 2, *Council of Foreign Ministers*, (Washington: USGPO, 1970), 418; *cf.*, Sándor Balogh: "Az 1946. február 27-i magyar-csehszlovák lakosságcsere egyezmény," [The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Population Ex-change Agreement of February 27, 1946], Történelmi Szemle, no. 1 (1979), pp. 59–66.

19 Potsdam Conference Documents 1945. Reel 1; Enikő Sajti, *Nemzettudat, jugoszlávizmus, magyarság* [National Consciousness, Yugoslavism and Hungarians] (Szeged, 1991), pp. 123–131.

United States government that the Yugoslav claims were not satisfied, and that Czechoslovak demands were only partially met. In general, Washington strongly objected to solving territorial differences by punishing entire ethnic groups for the sufferings caused by war (with the significant exception of the mass relocation of Germans.)[20]

Britain's attitude represented another important reason why the matter of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian and Yugoslav-Hungarian borders never came up in the course of postwar negotiations. Even before the Potsdam Conference, the British government had decided to support the restoration of the 1938 borders.[21] Taking all of this into consideration, it would have been a quixotic gesture indeed for the United States to insist on implementing the Advisory Committee's suggestions.

Unlike the Csallóköz and the Baranya-Bacska-Bánát issues, the status of Transylvania remained uncertain until May 1946. The American delegation at Potsdam recommended that "the three principal Allies proceed in the near future with preliminary talks concerning the establishment of a definite boundary between Hungary and Romania, and that favourable consideration be given to revision of the prewar frontier in favour of Hungary on ethnic grounds."[22] When the preliminary talks were held at the September 1945 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Soviet delegation made no secret of the fact that it wanted to see "the whole of Transylvania" go to Romania. The joint British-American position, however, was for "examining the respective claims of the two States." Secretary of State Byrnes noted in the course of the debate that "the change which he had in mind would not affect more than 3,000 square miles." This was close to the minimum area recommended by the Advisory Committee in 1943–1944 (see Map 4, Rectification of Boundary table). No decision was made on the matter at the London session, and the Council agreed to adjourn the debate.[23]

The next time the problem of Transylvania came up was at the April 1946 meeting of the deputy foreign ministers, also held in London. The Soviet representatives insisted, once again, that the Trianon borders be restored. Britain and France reluctantly accepted this proposal and the United States was no longer in a position to press its own revisionist plans. American representatives did sug-

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[20] NA RG 59. Notter File, Box 154. H–165, and Box 116. CAC–328; *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers. 1945,* vol. IV. (Washington: USGPO, 1968), 928–929; and *FRUS 1946,* vol. 3. *Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings* (Washington: USGPO, 1970).

[21] Mihály Fülöp: A berlini (potsdami) értekezlet és az európai béke, [The Potsdam Conference and European Peace]. In: *Külpolitika,* 1987, no. 5, p. 170.

[22] Potsdam Conference Documents 1945, Reel 1, and no. 407.; *cf., FRUS, Diplomatic Papers 1945,* vol. 5. pp. 509–510, 524–527.

[23] *FRUS, Diplomatic Papers 1945,* vol. 2, pp. 147–150, 184, 227–228, 275–283, 311; *Cf.,* Sándor Balogh: Erdély és a második világháború utáni békeszerződés," [Transylvania and the Peace Settlement after World War II.]. In: *Külpolitika,* 1987, no. 5, pp. 188–189; Kovrig, *op. cit.,* p. 77.

gest that "provision be made to leave the way open for direct negotiations between the Governments of Romania and Hungary with a view to adjusting the frontier so as to reduce the number of persons living under alien rule." The Russians, however, refused to agree to even this diluted wording.[24]

With no consensus forthcoming, the deputy foreign ministers submitted a Soviet and an American recommendation to the May session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Had there been British and French support, it is possible that Byrnes would have insisted on at least a token compromise. Diplomatically isolated, he judged the matter to be a lost cause and did not want to further test Soviet-American relations, strained enough as they were, with insistence on having his way on a 'third-rate' issue. In return for a trivial Soviet concession, he withdrew the American motion and accepted the Soviet plan. John C. Campbell, secretary of the peace delegation, justified Byrnes's move as follows: "With so many clauses in the four treaties in dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union, this one did not seem worth arguing about any longer."[25]

The fate of Transylvania was sealed by the American retreat. At the September 5 session of the Romanian Territorial and Political Committee where the issue of Transylvania was reviewed for the last time, the United States delegate, William Averell Harriman, made the following statement about the draft peace treaty: "The United States had not been a strong supporter of the proposed text but wished to make it clear that he would vote for it since it had been agreed by the Council." With this, the question of Transylvania was taken off the agenda.[26]

As regards the planned minority protection system, there was no follow-up. It was assumed that there would be no need for special minority rights in a true democratic state. This approach is generally blamed on the Soviet Union. However, it should be noted that this presumption was by no means confined to the 'socialist camp.' For a long time, major international organizations, such as the United Nations, concurred with this point of view. In 1948, Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the United Nations' Human Rights Committee, declared that as long as the human rights of individuals were observed, a declaration of minorities' rights was not needed.[27] In point of fact, it is hard to say exactly when, how and why the proposals for the perfection of the interwar system disappeared from the diplomatic scene.

The defeat suffered by American diplomacy at the hands of the Soviets was completed in June of 1947, when Ferenc Nagy, the new prime minister of Hungary, was forced to leave the country and the systematic liquidation of the fledgling Hungarian democracy began. The United States was outraged by the

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24 *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 2, *Council of Foreign Ministers*, pp. 259–260.

25 *Ibid.;* John C. Campbell: The European Territorial Settlement, In: *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 212.

26 *FRUS, 1946*, vol. 3, *Paris Peace Conference: Proceedings*, pp. 375–376.

27 László Kövágó: *Kisebbség-nemzetiség* [Minority, Nationality]. Budapest 1977, p. 30.

Hungarian prime minister's forced exile. President Truman called it a disgrace and the Department of State referred to it as a *coup d'état*. Once again, however, Washington's vehemence was soon spent. Some junior members of the State Department did suggest that the Nagy case be brought before the United Nations, but the idea was rejected by the head of the European Department who not want the matter to distract the Security Council's attention from the problem of Greece.[28]

As the Americans saw it, Hungary became one of the communist states of Eastern Europe in the summer of 1947. Consequently, the policy of American support, officially called 'limited encouragement,' was abandoned. Hungary's short-lived democracy was commemorated by John F. Montgomery in his 1947 memoirs as follows: "For a second time within a decade, a small European country, Hungary, is being turned into a satellite of an overwhelmingly strong neighbor."[29] As we know, this state of affairs lasted for over 40 years.

Povzetek

Ameriški medvojni načrti glede Madžarske in Pariška mirovna konferenca, 1941–1947

Tri tedne po napadu na Pearl Harbour, 28. decembra 1941 je predsednik Franklin D. Roosevelt odobril ustanovitev posebne organizacije znotraj ministrstva za zunanje zadeve, ki se je imenovala Svetovalni odbor za povojno zunanjo politiko. Naloga odbora je bilo oblikovanje politike, ki bi ZDA služila kot usmeritev v povojnih mirovnih pogajanjih. Odbor je deloval pod različnimi imeni vse do konca vojne, izdelal je na tisoče poročil in organiziral na stotine sestankov. Gradivo je bilo zbrano v kar 300 škatlah, okoli 800 tipkanih strani pa se je ukvarjalo izključno s prihodnostjo Madžarske.

Namen tega prispevka je prikazati različna stališča o prihodnosti Madžarske, ki so se pojavila v razpravah tega Svetovalnega odbora. Predstavitev je razdeljena na štiri dele. V prvem delu je podan širši kontekst problema: situacija v vzhodni in srednji Evropi in programi regionalnega sodelovanja. Načrti za tesnejše gospodarsko in politično sodelovanje so bili v središču pozornosti članov odbora. Po dolgih razpravah so sklenili, da naj ima to sodelovanje obliko zveze neodvisnih držav in ne federacije.

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[28] Stanley M. Max: *The United States, Great Britain and the Sovietization of Hungary, 1945–1948.* Boulder 1985, pp. 105–110.

[29] John F. Montgomery: *Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite.* New York: 1947, "Dedication."

V drugem delu so obravnavane etnične napetosti in možna sredstva za njihovo reševanje. Obstajali so naslednji trije osnovni predlogi: 1) prilagoditev političnih meja etničnim ločnicam v največji možni meri in kjerkoli je to mogoče; 2) izmenjava prebivalstva, ki živi v obmejnih območjih; 3) odobritev manjšinskih pravic, tudi pravice do kulturne in ozemeljske avtonomije. Kar je zadevalo meje je odbor prepoznal štiriindvajset spornih območij v vzhodni Evropi, med njimi tudi celotno madžarsko mejo razen tiste med Avstrijo in Madžarsko, ki je štela za pravično.

Predmet tretjega dela je vprašanje demokratizacije Madžarske. Analize kažejo, da je imela medvojna Madžarska dve veliki slabosti, in sicer pomanjkanje prave zemljiške reforme in pomanjkanje prave politične demokracije. Politični sistem je bil vedno znova označen kot "pol-avtoritaren". Zato je odbor načrtoval, da ga nadomesti z "resnično demokratično vlado". Kar pa zadeva ponovno razdelitev posesti, pa so se zavzemali za "razumno načrtovano reformo".

V zaključku je podan opis, kako se je predlagana ameriška politika glede Madžarske izkazala za popoln polom. Razlog za to ni bila le določena konceptualna praznina ameriške diplomacije, kot to namigujejo nekateri, niti ne Roosevelтova bolezen, temveč sovjetska prevlada v regiji in pomanjkanje stvarnih interesov Amerike, da bi tej prevladi oporekala. Poraz ameriške diplomacije je bil dokončen leta 1947 s podpisom nove mirovne pogodbe in pričetkom sistematičnega uničevanja rojevajoče se madžarske demokracije.