

UDK 321.74(438-15)"1945/1989"

Jakub Tyszkiewicz*

*Communist Propaganda in the German Provinces
Ceded to Poland (1945–1989)*

The German Provinces ceded to Poland by the Allied powers in the Potsdam Agreement in August 1945 were the subject of intensive propaganda campaigns by the Polish Communists during their 40 years of rule in Poland. In this paper, I will present the main phases of these efforts and their primary aims.

It must first be noted that the decision of the Allies in Potsdam to move Polish borders to the west was the result of events that had taken place five years earlier: above all, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact signed by Hitler and Stalin on August 23, 1939. In a secret additional protocol, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to the eventual partition of Poland and that the prewar eastern provinces of Poland, invaded by the Red Army on September 17, 1939, would be annexed to the Soviet sphere of influence. Even after the German attack in June 1941 when the Soviet Union became an ally of Great Britain and Poland (Polish soldiers had been fighting against the Nazis since the beginning of World War Two), Stalin did not give up his territorial claims. Indeed at the Teheran Conference, he reiterated his intention to retain the territorial acquisitions made by the Soviet Union in 1939. At this point, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that Poland's territorial losses to Russia in the east would be compensated by the annexation of German territory in the west.¹

Although the Polish government-in-exile in London was unwilling to make this bargain, the Allies proceeded without consultation with the Poles. In April 1943, Stalin abruptly withdrew diplomatic recognition from the pro-western Polish government when it appeared to support Nazi accusations that the Soviet Army was responsible for the 1940 massacre of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. In fact, Stalin's manoeuvre was nothing more than a pretext to install a pro-Soviet Communist government in Poland. It was also at this time that Stalin began to support the claims of his Polish puppets regarding the annexation of German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers. From this point on, these territories were the subject of an intense propaganda campaign by Polish Communists.

* **PhD, Professor, Instytut Historyczny, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Ul. Szewska 49, PL-50-139 Wrocław; e-mail: jatysz@wp.pl**

¹ See for example: W. R. Keylor: *The Twentieth-Century World. An International History*. New York 1996, p. 191.

The process had already begun in the middle of 1944. The arrangement was based on the Polish Communists' voluntary ceding to Stalin and the Soviet Union pre-war eastern territories that had historically been an important part of the Polish cultural heritage. These territories included Lvov (now located in Ukraine) and Vilnius (now located in Lithuania). The vast majority of Poles saw this concession as a betrayal of Polish interests. As a consequence, Stalin's puppet government needed to generate arguments to convince the Polish nation that the annexation of the former German provinces would be beneficial to postwar Poland. This campaign intensified at the end of the war when it became clear that the territories to the east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers would be transferred to the Polish administration by Red Army commanders who up until then had been treating them a part of Germany.

The first phase of the propaganda campaign (1945–1948) focused on the role of the new Communist rulers in Poland. These leaders described themselves as being solely responsible for the 'return' of the former German provinces to Poland. During that period, the area was officially called the 'recovered territories'. Polish communists hoped that the presence of those provinces within Polish borders would cause a change in attitude among the Polish people (who remained staunchly anti-communist) regarding the Soviet regime installed in Warsaw. This intention could be clearly identified in a speech by Władysław Gomułka, the head of the Polish Communists at that time, who stated that the 'recovered territories' were the only way to create sympathy between the pro-Soviet government and Polish society.²

It is interesting and worth emphasizing that many of the slogans used by the communist propaganda machine were based on theories that had been in existence since the end of the nineteenth century.³ The issue of annexing the German provinces had already been present in prewar studies written by scholars from Poznań University. These scholars had contacts with the Polish Western Union and were engaged in the problem of the so-called 'postulate lands' as they were described before World War Two. Those same scholars also played a key role in the popularization of the issue of the postwar 'recovered territories' and, though their political convictions tended more toward national political theory, they frequently collaborated with the communist regime.⁴

² Protokół z plenarnego posiedzenia KC PPR odbytego w Warszawie w dniach 20–21 V 1945 r., (w:) *Protokół obrad KC PPR maj 1945, Dokumenty do dziejów PRL*, z. 1 (Warszawa: ISP PAN 1992), s. 11.

³ Compare: T. Kulak: *Polska myśl zachodnia okresu rozbiorów* (in:) *O ziemie Piastów i polski lud (1795–1918), W stronę Odry i Bałtyku*. Wrocław 1990, p. 25–38; W. Wrześniński: *Kresy czy pogranicze. Problem Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych w polskiej myśli politycznej XIX i XX w.* In: *Między Polską etniczną a historyczną. Polska myśl polityczna XIX i XX w.*, t. 6 (1988), p. 119–165.

⁴ See more: M. Mroczko: *Polska myśl zachodnia 1918–1939 (Kształtowanie i upowszechnianie)*. Poznań 1986, p. 114–140, 172–349; B. Piotrowski: *O Polskę nad Odrą i Bałtykiem. Myśl zachodnia i badania niemieckoznawcze Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego (1919–1939)*.

Communist propaganda not only drew from ideas that had been current among intellectual circles connected with National Democracy and other nationalist parties before World War Two, but also from programmes generated during the war by the Polish government-in-exile in London.⁵

The main argument used to prove that the 'recovered territories' were Polish was a historical one. The communists pointed out that since the early Middle Ages, and even before, there were groups of people of Polish origin who had been 'Germanized' over the centuries. Again this argument was a repetition of prewar ideas.⁶ It soon became clear, even to the Communists, that the argument was not effective. Therefore, a second argument was developed: specifically, that the presence of the 'recovered territories' within Polish borders was crucial to the security of Poland and indeed to the security of all Europe. First, the theory was advanced that the annexation of these territories to Poland would deter Germany from any future eastward aggression, and second, that it would allow Poland to defend itself more effectively. These theories had also been present before the war. Indeed, the notion of a new Polish-German border along the Oder and Neisse Rivers as the safest border for the Polish state was a repetition of a popular argument in the rightwing radical nationalist press in 1940 that continued during the war.⁷

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the decision to establish a borderline on the Oder-Lusitanian Neisse Rivers had already been made at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945. Though the final definition of this border would be decided during subsequent peace negotiations with Germany, the communist propaganda machine made it known that the Allies had already decided on a new western border for Poland. It was no surprise, therefore, that shortly after Potsdam, Władysław Gomułka triumphantly announced that the Allies had officially recognized the new western border of Poland.⁸ The reiteration of this statement became compulsory in any public announcements made by the communist regime during that time. "The leaders of the three biggest powers in the world have confirmed the recovery of the western territories to the Polish administration. This border was demarcated by Polish forces fighting side by side with the Red Army," Ostap Dłuski, one of the main communists responsible for the propaganda campaign, wrote, "and will undoubtedly be recognized by the world during the peace conference."⁹

Poznań 1987, p. 174–290. See also *Polska myśl zachodnia w Poznaniu i Wielkopolsce. Jej rozwój i realizacja w wiekach XIX i XX*, pod red. A. Kwileckiego. Poznań 1980.

⁵ M. Orzechowski: *Odra–Nysa Łużycka–Bałtyk w polskiej myśli politycznej okresu II wojny światowej*. Wrocław 1969; St. Dąbrowski: *Koncepcje powojennych granic Polski w programach i działalności polskiego ruchu ludowego w latach 1939–1945*. Wrocław 1971; B. Pasierb: *Polska myśl polityczna okresu II wojny światowej wobec Niemiec*. Poznań 1990.

⁶ A. Skowroński: *Polska a problem Niemiec 1945–1965*. Warszawa 1967, p. 15.

⁷ Pasierb, op. cit., p. 247.

⁸ W. Gomułka: *W walce o demokrację ludową*. Warszawa 1947, p. 167.

⁹ "Głos Ludu" no 200 from 3rd of August 1945.

In an article written by Gomułka one can easily identify other key elements in the propaganda campaign, above all an emphasis on the crucial role played by the communist regime in recovering the western territories. The efforts of the Communists during the war and the new policy of alliance with the Soviet Union – the latter described as "the only state to unconditionally support Polish demands" – were invariably defined as key factors in the 'recovery' of the former German provinces. The communist regime put forward other arguments as well – for example, the economic significance of these regions that would allow the rebuilding of Poland and assure its prosperous growth in the future. Postwar Poland would have the opportunity to be an economic and political European power, but only if Poles settled in the 'recovered territories'. In these ways, the communist regime created a motivation for the Polish people to justify the replacement of eastern territories taken by the Soviet Union with new provinces to the west. Gomułka appealed to Poles to settle in the new territories. "Our victory will be complete only if all the towns and villages in the west and on the Baltic Sea will be populated by Poles." Only then would "haughty Prussian imperialism" be replaced by "the Polish peace guard."¹⁰

It is worth noting that even the economic and demographic arguments used by the Communists were recycled from prewar ideas of scholars connected to the movement called Polish Western Thought. The idea that shifting the Polish border to the west would trigger a change in the economic structure of Poland was formulated for the first time by the offices of the Polish government-in-exile in London.¹¹

Other important elements of communist propaganda – its use in the political fight against the democratic opposition and against the Catholic Church in Poland – were introduced in the period from 1946 to 1948. First, the prewar government and the pro-western Polish government-in-exile were accused by the Soviet puppet state of renouncing these same territories. The 'recovery' of this territory was made possible only by the Polish nation's "destruction of the power of great landowners and capitalists." After the American Secretary of State questioned the new Polish border in a speech made in September 1946, the communist propaganda machine also repeatedly stated that the United States was against the 'recovered territories'. As the sole democratic opposition party in Poland, the Polish Peasant Party, was politically supported by Washington, and thus was also said to be against Polish national interests. This was used by the Communists as a pretext to launch a political campaign against the opposition and to minimize its role in Polish society shortly before elections were announced. Another political campaign, this one against the Catholic Church, was launched in April 1948. After a letter regarding the fate of Germans expelled from Eastern Europe was sent by Pope Pius XII to the German bishops, Polish

¹⁰ Gomułka, op. cit., p. 171–172.

¹¹ *O Odrę, Nysę Łużycką i Bałtyk (1939–1944)*, t. 3, Wrocław 1990, doc. No 6, p. 31.

Communists attempted to discredit the Catholic Church in the eyes of Polish society. This campaign produced no good results and was soon abandoned.¹²

It is worth noting that the communist propaganda campaign for Poland's new western territories never admitted that the 'recovered territories' were compensation for lost areas in eastern Poland. Only once, in August 1945, was it openly stated that the loss of Polish territory on its eastern border had to be compensated for in the west.¹³ The propaganda campaign also abandoned the approach that the 'recovered territories' were compensation for damage suffered during the Germany occupation of Poland.

Until 1948, the Polish Communists tried instead to convince the people that the western provinces had been in some way linked with the Polish territory 'forever'. They also attempted to prove that there were no differences between the various parts of Poland, contradicting earlier statements that the provinces taken in 1945 were more advanced than the rest of the country. The successful linking of the 'recovered territories' with the rest of Poland was presented as the single greatest triumph of the communist leadership after World War Two. In 1948, the regime in Warsaw decided to exhibit this achievement in a monumental and unusual show called the *Exhibition of the Recovered Territories* in Wrocław (German Breslau until 1945). The show was an effort to finally prove their version of the story, though reality was somewhat different.¹⁴

The Western Institute in Poznań took an active part in creating a scholarly basis for the importance and irreversibility of the decision made in Potsdam regarding the Polish-German border. The institute, created in 1945, assembled people who had been engaged in the development of Polish Western Thought before the war. In 1947, Alfons Klafkowski published a book entitled *Legal Basis of the Oder-Neisse Border in Light of the Yalta and Potsdam Treaties*. In this work, he considered the legal position of Poland regarding its new borders and stressed that the Oder-Neisse border had been recognized in accordance with a formula in the agreement that stated "former German lands, east of the Polish border." In other words, the matter had been decided, not only *de facto* but also *de jure*. Klafkowski also stressed the already fact that both the Yalta and Potsdam agreements consented to the notion of a territorial equivalent for Poland. In accordance with this notion, the 'recovered territories' had been assigned to the Polish state by the Allies in Potsdam. He also considered the decision to expel Germans from Poland. He used the term 'resettling' which was the official term used by Polish Communists at that time. Although this policy had not been specifically defined in Potsdam, he noted that the Polish state was the

¹² More about this subject see: Jakub Tyszkiewicz: *Sto wielkich dni Wrocławia. Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych we Wrocławiu a propaganda ziem zachodnich i północnych w latach 1945–1948*. Wrocław 1997, p. 15–32.

¹³ Trybuna Robotnicza, nr. 184 z 28 VIII 1945 r.

¹⁴ More Tyszkiewicz, loc. cit.

main administrative ruler of this territory.¹⁵ The arguments from this book were often repeated by Klafkowski and used by other authors in the nineteen-sixties and seventies.

The second phase of intense propaganda regarding the 'recovered territories' began in October 1956 and was connected to the return of Władysław Gomułka to power as First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. The German question was extremely important to him and the integration of these territories with the rest of Poland became one of the watchwords of his new propaganda campaign. From 1956 to 1970, the main plank of the propaganda campaign was the fact that a new generation of Poles had been born and raised in the region. The effort here was the creation of a unanimous social group, fully integrated with the rest of Polish society, i.e., the young citizens of 'western lands', the new Polish provinces in the west. The new propaganda campaign also attempted to show that this new integrated Polish community was truly 'socialist' and that this had been achieved through the efforts of the communist regime. Until the end of the sixties, this issue played a crucial role in propaganda regarding the western territories. It was perhaps even more potent than the question of German 'revisionism' presented in the Polish media, i.e., the fear of a potential West German claim on the region that arose from the fact that the government in Bonn had never officially recognized the new Polish borders.¹⁶

And yet old slogans persisted. They could be detected in the 1965 speech made by Gomułka to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of victory over Germany. The leader of the Polish Communist Party said that though it had been widely believed in 1945 that German imperialism and Nazism were defeated forever, the current situation indicated otherwise. Gomułka particularly condemned the 'revisionists' in West Germany who strived to change world opinion regarding the *status quo* created in Potsdam. West Germany must be held responsible for "stirring the spirit of chauvinism, militarism, and revenge in the German nation" with its demands for territorial changes and a returned to the old *Drang nach Osten*. Gomułka stressed that though West Germany was not a direct neighbour of Poland, the government in Bonn continued to question that border. Gomułka feared the possibility of a united Germany adding that: "...the problem of the Oder-Neisse border will not be the subject of a Polish-German or international bargain, nor will the unification of Germany mean the swallowing of GDR by FRG." This prediction turned out to be false. Gomułka repeated his own words from August 1945: that Poland had returned to the Oder, Neisse and Baltic Sea, and that this return was sanctioned by Potsdam. Moreover, the Polish-German border had been permanently defined in the agreement with the first "peaceful, socialist German state" – namely, East Ger-

¹⁵ A. Klafkowski: *Podstawy prawne granicy Odra-Nisa na tle umów Jaltańskiej i Poczdamskiej*. Poznań 1947.

¹⁶ See more in: G. Strauchold: *Wrocław – okazjonalna stolica Polski. Wokół powojennych obchodów rocznic historycznych*. Wrocław 2003.

many or GDR which, in 1950 in the treaty of Zgorzelec, consented to "the irrevocable facts of Potsdam."¹⁷

This summary of Gomułka's speech is useful because it clearly illustrates the main thrust of the communist government's propaganda during the period from 1956 to 1970. It concentrated on three main points and above all on the unconditional decision by the Allies made at Potsdam. The description in the Potsdam Agreement of provinces to the east of the Oder-Neisse line as 'former German territories' was presented as important proof. According to propaganda, it meant that the Allies' agreement in August 1945 viewed territories taken over by Poland separately from the occupation zones. From this, one Polish author drew the conclusion that the term 'under Polish administration' had permanent implications because only the occupation zones were temporary. Another important proof of the permanent shift of the border was found in the 'resettlement' of approximately two million Germans from this territory. Polish propaganda stressed that many of these Germans had been expelled by the Nazis during the last months of war or had fled before the Red Army offensive. Because of this "there was no attempt to announce to the world that this population transfer ... had been temporary, that there was any perspective for reversing this exodus."¹⁸

Legal arguments were also presented in the official propaganda of the nineteen-sixties. In 1965, Kłafkowski once again repeated his earlier arguments about the Potsdam Agreement. In his opinion the decision made by the Allies remained in force with no time limit. He pointed out that it had never been suggested that the agreement be dissolved either in part or in its entirety, or indeed any specific authorizations and obligations therein. Even violations of the Potsdam Agreement were not considered by the Allies as a withdrawal from the decisions made in 1945.¹⁹

The agreements signed in 1970 between West Germany and the Soviet Union (as one of the four powers responsible for Germany as a whole) and Poland were interpreted by the Polish communist propaganda machine as a tacit acceptance of the territorial *status quo*, i.e., as recognition of the postwar borders. It was said that the agreement between Poland and West Germany meant the recognition of the loss of those formerly German territories and at the same time underscored the "pointlessness of questioning the Potsdam boundary decisions."²⁰

During the next decade (1980–1989), propaganda related to the provinces 'recovered' by Poland in 1945 did not play an important role in the public sphere. Old notions such as the threat of German 'revisionism' and the building of a 'socialist' society in this region were not relevant or convincing for most

¹⁷ Przemówienie w XX rocznicę zwycięstwa nad faszyzmem, (w:) Władysław Gomułka: *Przemówienia, lipiec 1964–grudzień 1966* (Warszawa: KiW 1967), p. 266–277 i 289–290.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Kłafkowski: *Polska-NRF a umowa poczdamska*. Warszawa 1965.

²⁰ J. Kokot: *Od Poczdamu do Helsinek. Koniec okresu powojennego w Europie*. Opole 1974.

Poles after Solidarity (1980–1981). One begins to detect at this time the beginning of an independent view regarding the history of these territories. A distinct change took place when Jan Józef Lipski, a leader of the Polish democratic opposition, published a brochure entitled "Two Heimats, Two Patriotisms", in which he articulated a new attitude toward the regions taken by Poland in 1945 and the fate of the expelled Germans. He wrote the following: "The obligation to create a new life for the millions of Poles who had to leave their *heimat* in the eastern part of prewar Poland is only an excuse for what happened". He questioned the historical and ethnic arguments used by the communists as the principle reasons for moving the Polish borders westward. Undoubtedly, Lipski's new perspective was accepted by many Poles who began to protest against manipulations of the so-called 'German question' by the ruling government, to demand corrections in the false picture of the Polish-German past presented in communist propaganda campaigns, and to show a more sympathetic attitude towards the fate of the divided German nation. Although the propaganda continued to emphasize the special role of the communists in 'recovering' these territories for Poland, a new and independent view of these historical and social problems was emerging and it began to play a more important role in Polish communities in that region. When the democratic changes occurred in Poland in 1989, an open discussion in which official propaganda played no role was launched about the various problems between Poles and Germans.

There is no doubt that the 1990 recognition of Poland's western border by united Germany had an enormous effect on putting a stop to further propaganda efforts regarding the region east of the Oder-Neisse line. Although slogans similar to those used by the Communists can sometimes be found in the political manifestos of today's radical rightwing nationalist parties, most Polish publications present an objective reconstruction of the issue. For this reason, I cannot agree with the rather pessimistic attitude of Davide Artico regarding Polish historiography. In his abstract, he argues that "Polish historians seldom attempted any research on the de-Germanization and Polonization of that region, that is, on the postwar population transfers." In fact, during the past fifteen years of democracy, Polish scholars have put a great deal of effort into building an objective picture of the difficult history of Lower Silesia and others regions ceded to Poland in 1945. A collaborative work of Polish and German historians – four volumes of documents presenting a full account of the expulsion of Germans from 1945 to 1950 – deserves special mention.²¹ This issue has also been also been considered by B. Nitschke.²² B. Ociepka wrote a book about the German people of Lower Silesia from 1945 to 1970.²³ P. Madajczyk presented very

²¹ *Niemcy w Polsce 1945–1950*, vol. 1–4, ed. W. Borodziej, H. Lemberg, D. Bockowski. Warszawa 1999–2004.

²² *Wysiedlenie ludności niemieckiej z Polski*. Zielona Góra 1999.

²³ *Niemcy na Dolnym Śląsku 1945–1970*. Wrocław 1992.

valuable material about Germans in Poland²⁴ and J. Tyszkiewicz wrote about postwar communist propaganda dealing with the 'recovered territories'.²⁵ A book by J. Kochanowski tells of the fate of German prisoners in Poland.²⁶ There are also a number of new general historical works about Silesia,²⁷ Lower Silesia,²⁸ and Wrocław²⁹ written by historians from the University of Wrocław that objectively present the complex and multinational past of those territories over the centuries. These works received good reviews not only in Polish but also in German scholarly periodicals. I conclude, therefore, that Polish historians have made a serious effort to provide the Polish people with an objective picture of the situations of both Germans and Poles from 1945 to 1947 and that their work has gone a long way toward eliminating the influence of decades of communist propaganda campaigns.

Povzetek

Komunistična propaganda v zvezi z nekdanjimi nemškimi ozemlji, ki so pripadla Poljski (1945–1989)

Nekdanje nemško ozemlje, ki so ga tri velesile avgusta 1945 v Potsdamu priznale Poljski, je bilo med vladavino komunistov na Poljskem v ospredju intenzivne propagande. V prispevku predstavljam glavne faze in cilje teh prizadevanj.

V prvem obdobju (1945–1948) je propaganda izpostavljala predvsem vlogo novih komunističnih voditeljev na Poljskem, ki naj bi bili edini, ki so bili Poljski sposobni "vrniti" nekdanje nemško ozemlje. Pripadnost teh območij Poljski je bila tudi edini dejavnik, ki je poljsko družbo (ki je bila v glavnem protikomunistična) povezoval s sovjetskim marionetnim režimom. Propaganda je poudarjala gospodarski pomen tega ozemlja, s pomočjo katerega se bo država lahko na novo utrdila in dosegala uspešno rast. Kot drugo pa je t.i. "ponovno pridobljeno ozemlje" pomenilo tudi nadomestilo za škodo, ki jo je Poljska utrpela pod nemško okupacijo. Uporabljalo se je tudi kot sredstvo v boju proti demokratični opoziciji in katoliški cerkvi, predvsem v letih 1946–1948. Izredna "Razstava povrnjenih ozemelj" v Wrocławu leta 1948 naj bi pokazala, da je bilo to ozemlje ponovno "za vedno" združeno s preostalim poljskim ozemljem in da

²⁴ P. Madajczyk: *Niemcy polscy*. Warszawa 2001.

²⁵ Tyszkiewicz, op. cit.

²⁶ J. Kochanowski: *W polskiej niewoli. Niemieccy jeńcy wojenni w Polsce 1945–1950*. Warszawa 2001.

²⁷ *History of Silesia*. Wrocław 2002.

²⁸ *History of Lower Silesia*. Wrocław 2006.

²⁹ W. Suleja: *Historia Wrocławia*, t. 3. Wrocław 2001.

je to predvsem dosežek komunističnih naporov po koncu druge svetovne vojne. Realnost pa je bila očitno drugačna.

Naslednje obdobje intenzivne propagande glede tega območja se je začelo oktobra 1956, ko je Władysław Gomułka postal prvi sekretar Komunistične partije na Poljskem. Ker je bil nemški problem zanj eden večjih problemov, je propaganda zopet poudarjala pomen združitve tega ozemlja s preostalo Poljsko. V obdobju 1956–1970 glavni motiv ni bila ponovna zgraditev tega območja, temveč vzpostavitev enotne družbene skupine mladih poljskih državljanov, ki so bili na tem območju rojeni in zato tudi že polno integrirani v poljsko družbo. Jasno je, da je bila, kot je izhajalo iz propagande, ta integracija možna le zaradi prizadevanj komunističnih voditeljev. Dokazati so si tudi prizadevali, da ta nova integrirana skupina v bistvu predstavlja novo "socialistično" družbo. Do konca 1960-ih let je imel ta problem najpomembnejšo vlogo pri propagandi teh ozemelj, celo pomembnejšo od tedaj še vedno prisotnega nemškega "revizionizma".

V obdobju 1970–1980, ko je bil Edward Gierek novi komunistični voditelj, so se ta prizadevanja nadaljevala, a z zmanjšano močjo. To pa predvsem zato, ker so se vzpostavili diplomatski odnosi med Bonn in Varšavo, zahodno-nemška vlada in parlament pa sta priznala mejo po črti Odra–Nisa. Poleg tega je komunistična propaganda poudarjala, da je nova združena "socialistična" družba na Poljskem že vzpostavljena.

V naslednjem desetletju propaganda ni imela več tako pomembne vloge. Nekdanja gesla, kot sta nemški "revizionizem" in graditev "socialistične" družbe, po obdobju "Solidarnosti" na Poljskem, ki je pomenilo začetek neodvisnega pogleda na zgodovino tega območja, za družbo niso bila več prepričljiva. Komunistična propaganda je še vedno poudarjala vlogo komunistov pri vrnitvi tega ozemlja Poljski. Od leta 1981 pa je vse pomembnejšo vlogo začel igrati nov, neodvisen pogled na zgodovino tega območja in socialne težave tam živečega prebivalstva. Ko pa je na Poljskem prišlo do demokratičnih sprememb, je bila omogočena tudi odprta razprava o vseh težjih problemih, kar pa je pomenilo tudi konec uradne propagande.